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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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22 March 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, Headquarters United States
Air Force

SUBJECT: Current Capabilities of the Democratic Peoples Republic
of Northern Korea (ORE 18-50)

REFERENCE: DCI Directive 3/1 dated 8 July 1948

1. Problem.

To estimate the current capabilities of the Democratic Peoples Republic of northern Korea.

2. Scope.

The scope of the study is indicated in the working outline (Enclosure A) which was prepared by ORE in consultation with OIR as a basis for the development of this project.

3. Deadlines.

It is necessary to have an uncoordinated draft by 15 April. Departmental contributions are therefore urgently desired by 31 March 1950.

4. Departmental Responsibilities.

a. The intelligence organizations of the several departments are invited to contribute as follows:

- (1) OIR: Sections I and II of Enclosure A, and pertinent subsections of IV and V;
- (2) G-2: Section IIIA and pertinent subsections of IV and V;
- (3) ONI: Section IIIC and pertinent subsections of IV and V;
- (4) AID: Section IIIB and pertinent subsections of IV and V.

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h. Agency contributions are urgently desired by the close of business on 31 March 1950, and earlier if possible.

25X1A **g.** Mr. [REDACTED] Code 143, extension 2353, has been designated ORE representative for this project.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

[REDACTED]

25X1A

THEODORE HABBITT
Assistant Director
Reports and Estimates

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CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES REPUBLIC
OF NORTHERN KOREA (ORE 18-50)

(WORKING OUTLINE)

Note: This outline is designed to serve as a basis for contributions and is not an outline of the finished paper.

I. Political Situation

A. Genesis of Present Political System

1. When, how, why

B. Governmental Organization and Administrative Effectiveness

1. Soviet Influence and Control

2. Form of Government

- a. Organization

- b. Extent and nature of popular participation

3. Native Leadership

- a. Loyalty to regime

- b. Factional

- c. Training, experience and ability of personnel

- d. Effectiveness

4. Government Control Organizations and Techniques

- a. Organizations

- b. Activities

- c. Effectiveness

C. Political Organizations

1. North Korea Labor Party

- a. Organization

- b. Relation to Government

- c. Leadership

- d. Membership - size, quantitative and qualitative composition

- e. Training of membership

- f. Factions

- g. Activities

- Propaganda - education

- h. Effectiveness

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2. Other Front Organizations

- a. Purpose
- b. Composition
- c. Activity
- d. Effectiveness

D. Support and Opposition

1. Psychological - Popular Reactions

- a. To the Communist regime
- b. Republic of Korea and foreign propaganda
- c. UNCOK activity in southern Korea
- d. Other
- e. Significance

2. Organized Opposition

- a. Size, activity, leadership
- b. Extent of external support
- c. Effectiveness

3. Unorganized Opposition

- a. Extent and nature
- b. Susceptibility to external direction and support

E. External Relations

- 1. With USSR
- 2. With China
- 3. With Other Communist Governments and Parties

II. Economic

- A. "Socialism" in the DPRK economy: (A chronological account of the various steps taken toward Communization of the economy, detailing advances and set-backs.)
- B. Economic Productivity of the DPRK: (Introduction with a very general survey of economic conditions comparing productivity under the Japanese, immediately after the War, and as of 1 Mar 1950.)
 - 1. Metals and Mining. (An analysis of the capacity of the DPRK to produce significant quantities of iron and steel, light metals, and other strategic and industrial minerals. To consider limiting factors.)

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2. **Industry.** (An analysis of the capacity of the DPRK to fabricate metals, to produce industrial chemicals, fertilizers, and explosives, and to produce textiles and consumer goods in significant quantities. To consider limiting factors.)
 3. **Agriculture and Fishing.** (An analysis of crop and marine yields and agricultural-fishing methods as they relate to the self-sufficiency in foods of the DPRK. To consider limiting factors.)
 4. **Power, Transport, and Telecommunications.** (An analysis of sources of power, as they relate to the productive capacity of the DPRK, and of the predominant orientation of lines of communication. To consider limiting factors.)
 5. **Construction and Forestry.** (An analysis of the construction material situation in the DPRK as it relates to the over-all economy. To consider limiting factors.)
- C. **Foreign Trade of the DPRK.** (An analysis of the peculiar trade relations the DPRK enjoys with the USSR, and a detailing of significant industrial and consumer shortages that must be met by foreign trade. Includes brief discussion of foreign trade with other areas.)
- D. **Internal Economic Conditions in the DPRK.** (An analysis of the impact "Socialization," external control, and distorted trade have had on the economic stability within the DPRK. Manpower and technical deficiencies to be discussed under this heading.)
- E. **Economic Capabilities of the DPRK.** (A general analysis of courses of action open to the DPRK in the light of their economic capabilities and limitations.)

III. Military

- A. **Ground Forces (including Border Constabulary and Internal Security Personnel)**
1. **Order of Battle - Strength, Composition, and Dispositions**
 2. **Critical Arms**
 - a. Tanks
 - b. Artillery
 - c. A.A.A.
 3. **Manpower Resources**
 - a. Domestic - Relation to Over-all national manpower requirement
 - b. Korean-Manchurian-CCF personnel
 - c. Adequacy

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4. State and Adequacy of Training

5. Logistics

- a. Capabilities of domestic supply
- b. Dependence on USSR and CCF support

6. Current Soviet Assistance

- a. Military mission
- b. Logistic support
- c. Degree of tactical assistance
- d. Training (including Koreans sent to USSR)

7. Loyalty and Morale

- a. Willingness to fight southern Koreans

8. Leadership and Factions

9. Capabilities

- a. Support of southern guerrilla operations
- b. Short-term military operations against southern Korea
- c. Long-term military operations against southern Korea
- d. Maintenance of internal security

10. Current Indicators - Movements, Concentrations, Stockpiling, etc.

B. Air Elements

- 1. Order of Battle
- 2. State and Adequacy of Training
- 3. Logistics

- a. Sources of supply and maintenance

4. Current Soviet Assistance

- a. Equipment
- b. Training

5. Loyalty and Morale

6. Capabilities

7. Current Indicators

C. Coast Guard

- 1. Order of Battle
- 2. Current Soviet Assistance

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3. Logistics
4. Loyalty and Morale
5. State and Adequacy of Training
6. Leadership and Factions
7. Capabilities
8. Current Indicators

IV. Current Actions against Republic of Korea

A. Political

1. Propaganda - Psychological Warfare
2. Infiltration and Espionage

B. Economic

C. Military

1. Border Actions
2. Guerrilla

V. Summary of Current Capabilities

A. To Control and Develop Northern Korea

B. Extend Control to Southern Korea

1. Brief Military Operations
2. Extend Military Operation
3. Political - Guerrilla

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